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BNL Quarterly Review, no. 229, June 2004. 
Trade liberalisation in Mexico: 
rhetoric and reality  
PENÉLOPE PACHECO-LÓPEZ and A.P. THIRLWALL 
1. Introduction 
Since the Second World War, the Mexican economy has had a che-
quered history, buffeted by internal and external shocks, and plagued 
by inflation and macroeconomic instability. Five major phases of 
economic performance and policy-making can be identified: firstly, 
the import substitution phase from the 1950s stretching into the late 
1970s; secondly, the oil boom from 1976 to 1981; thirdly, the debt 
crisis and its aftermath from 1982 to 1987 during the Presidency of 
Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado; fourthly, the period of macroeconomic 
reforms initiated by Carlos Salinas de Gortari from 1988 to 1994, and 
lastly the period since 1994 when Ernesto Zedillo came to power 
(replaced by President Fox in 2000) and Mexico locked itself into the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). In the mid-1980s, 
extensive trade liberalisation was initiated, accompanied by wide-
spread financial liberalisation, which was consolidated by the NAFTA 
agreement. What is striking about the economic performance of 
Mexico, however, is that the growth of the economy was far higher in 
the import-substitution phase than it has been in the post-liberalisation 
phase. The annual growth of gross domestic product (GDP) from 1950 
to 2000 is shown in Figure 1. 
The volatility of growth performance is immediately apparent, 
but what is even more interesting is the disparate average growth 
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performance between the different phases of policy-making identified 
above. In the import-substitution phase, growth averaged 7% per 
annum. In the years of the oil boom, the average growth was even 
higher at 7.4% per annum. During the debt crisis there was no growth 
at all, and since then growth has averaged only 3.5% per annum. If we 
distinguish between the period before trade reforms in 1985/86 and 
after, the contrast is striking. Average growth in the pre-liberalisation 
period (even allowing for the debt crisis) was over 6% per annum 
compared to under 3% per annum since liberalisation took place in a 
significant way (including the years since the formation of NAFTA). 
The process of liberalisation has been associated with a deterioration 
in growth performance of approximately one-half. 
 
FIGURE 1 
ANNUAL GROWTH OF MEXICAN GDP 1950-2000 
 
Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informática, Mexico. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to explore the possibility, and to 
suggest, that this association is not a coincidence because trade liberali-
sation has impacted unfavourably on the balance of payments of 
Mexico through a rise in the propensity to import, and this has low-
ered the growth of output consistent with a sustainable payments 
deficit. Domestic economic policy associated with trade and financial 
liberalisation has also worsened the balance of payments – growth 
trade-off by keeping  the exchange rate high (see also Blecker 1996) and 
encouraging types of investment with a high import content, includ-
ing foreign direct investment (FDI) by multinational companies, 
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particularly in the maquiladora sector. At the same time, export 
growth has not improved to compensate. The average growth of 
exports pre- and post-liberalisation has been about the same – 8% per 
annum in real terms. This bleak scenario contrasts markedly with the 
rhetoric of policy-makers and commentators at the time, particularly 
during the NAFTA negotiations, who promised a new dawn for the 
Mexican economy and people in terms of improved export perform-
ance and the growth of living standards. Lustig (1994, p. 47) quotes a 
leading forecasting firm saying that 
“NAFTA will double both the growth rate of Mexico’s overall 
economy and the growth rate of its wages – specifically boosting 
the wage growth rate from 1.2% to 2.4% per annum”. 
Burfisher, Robinson and Thierfebler (2001, p. 140) say that the studies 
of NAFTA using general equilibrium models all conclude that 
“NAFTA would benefit all three member countries [Mexico, the US 
and Canada], with the largest relative gains going to Mexico”, and they 
quote a pre-NAFTA survey which concluded that “the effects of 
NAFTA would be positive but small for the US economy, and posi-
tive and large for Mexico” (ibid., p. 126). 
What we show in this paper is the contrast between the rhetoric 
of liberalisation and the reality, which provides not only a salutary 
lesson for other developing countries attracted by the orthodoxy of 
trade liberalisation, but also for future trade negotiations in the Latin 
American region. The first lesson is that, contrary to orthodoxy, the 
balance of payments consequences of liberalisation matter. It is of the 
utmost importance to sequence liberalisation in such a way as to 
maintain a balance between exports and imports at a country’s capac-
ity growth rate, otherwise domestic deflation will be necessary and 
growth thwarted. The second lesson is that trade liberalisation is not a 
substitute for a development strategy. Moreover, liberalisation is not 
even an outward-orientated development strategy if domestic eco-
nomic policies are pursued which are inimical to the growth of ex-
ports (e.g. an overvalued exchange rate) and which encourage the 
growth of imports (e.g. multinational investment with a high import 
content). An industrial strategy and exchange rate policy must be 
supportive of the liberalisation process, otherwise liberalisation will be 
a recipe for disappointed expectations. 
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The paper will proceed as follows. Firstly, as a background, we 
will briefly consider the different phases of economic policy-making in 
the Mexican economy up to the period of liberalisation in the mid-
1980s. Secondly, we will discuss the trade liberalisation reforms of the 
mid-1980s and the NAFTA agreement, including policies towards 
FDI. Thirdly, we estimate, using econometric techniques, the impact 
of liberalisation on Mexican export growth, import growth and the 
trade balance. Fourthly, we formally consider the impact of trade 
liberalisation on GDP growth working through the balance of pay-
ments, also drawing on the work of Moreno-Brid (1998, 1999 and 
2001). Fourthly, we draw conclusions, and discuss future trade policy 
in the wider context of the Latin American region. 
2. Economic policy-making in Mexico 
It is well known that the import substitution policies implemented in 
virtually the whole of Latin America in the 1950s, including Mexico, 
were inspired by the ideas of Raul Prebisch (1950), who was the first 
economist after the Second World War to seriously challenge the 
doctrine of the mutual profitability of free trade for all participating 
countries. He had two justified worries relating to the productive and 
export structures of developing countries compared to developed 
countries. The first was the tendency for the prices of primary com-
modities to deteriorate relative to the price of industrial goods (the 
terms of trade argument – later the Prebisch-Singer thesis). The second 
was the balance of payments implications for developing countries of a 
low income elasticity of demand for primary commodity exports 
combined with a much higher income elasticity of demand for indus-
trial good imports. Both the terms of trade and balance of payments 
implications of specialisation in primary products by developing 
countries can offset the static resource gains from trade emphasised by 
the doctrine of comparative advantage (Thirlwall 2003). For Prebisch, 
the solution to these twin difficulties for developing countries was for 
them to industrialise behind protective barriers. 
In Mexico, three main forms of trade protection were applied: 
import tariffs, licensing restrictions and official reference prices. The 
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average nominal tariff on manufactured imports during the import 
substitution phase was over 30%, and the effective rate of protection 
(i.e. the protection of value-added) was over 70% (Villarreal 2000). 
Import licensing was used extensively, and the proportion of imported 
goods subject to licensing rose steadily during the period, mainly in 
response to balance of payments crises. In 1956, 17% of imports were 
subject to licensing; in 1974, over 80% of imports were protected by 
licensing, and during the years of the debt crisis, 1982-83, all imports 
were subject to licensing (even though the import substitution policy 
had been relaxed during the oil boom years of the late 1970s). For 
most of the period, import controls operated with a fixed nominal 
exchange rate that was devalued twice in the period – by 25% in 1976 
and 47% in 1977. During this period, Mexico was not exactly a closed 
economy, but imports on average were less than 10% of GDP, com-
pared to over 30% today. The World Bank (1987), in its categorisation 
of countries according to trade regimes over the period 1963-85, classi-
fied Mexico as a ‘moderately inward oriented’ country. The import 
substitution industrialisation policy officially ended with the debt 
crisis and change of government in 1982. The growth of GDP in the 
import substitution phase averaged 7% per annum, one of the highest 
growth rates in the world economy. 
The fast growth of output in the mid-1970s, however, was not 
‘painless’. The government over-extended itself, running a fiscal deficit 
of 20% of GDP, and borrowed heavily from overseas. In 1975, the 
trade deficit as a percentage of GDP rose to 2.7%, its highest level 
since 1960. This was enough to trigger a currency crisis, devaluation 
and resort to IMF borrowing. Oil came to the rescue temporarily, and 
allowed the growth of the economy to proceed at a rapid pace, while 
the trade deficit fell. There was also partial relaxation of import con-
trols. But the respite was short-lived. In 1981, the oil boom ended, and 
a period of renewed import restrictions began in order to protect the 
balance of payments. 
The end of the oil boom in Mexico coincided with a deteriora-
tion in world economic conditions. Rising international interest rates, 
and demand deflation in the developed industrialised countries to 
control inflation, plunged the whole world economy into recession, 
which severely affected commodity prices and the demand for the 
exports of developing countries. Mexico suffered a major capital flight. 
On top of this, its ratio of debt service payments to export earnings 
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(the debt-service ratio) rose to over 50% in 1982; and in August of that 
year Mexico was forced to suspend payments to creditors, which 
triggered the worldwide debt crisis. Mexico imposed strict exchange 
controls, and further import restrictions. The peso was also devalued, 
and a dual exchange rate system was introduced with the flexible rate 
allowed to ‘crawl’ within pre-announced margins. From 1982-84, 
however, the nominal exchange rate depreciation was less than the 
rate of inflation, so that the real exchange rate appreciated, adversely 
affecting exports. Movements in the nominal and real exchange rate of 
the Mexican economy from 1970 to 2000 are shown in Figure 2. 
 
FIGURE 2 
NOMINAL AND REAL EXCHANGE RATE OF THE MEXICAN ECONOMY, 1970-2000 
 
Source: Banco de México and World Bank (2002). 
 
In 1982 a drastic economic reform programme was introduced 
by the new government of Jose López Portillo, which formally ended 
the import substitution strategy pursued over the previous three 
decades. The intention was to re-orientate the economy from a state-
led development and trade protectionist strategy to a private-led 
growth and trade-openness policy. The immediate task, however, was 
to generate balance of payments surpluses to cope with the debt crisis, 
and this was done in orthodox ways through macro-deflation. The 
Programa Inmediato de Reorientación Económica (PIRE) was 
launched in 1983 with the major aim of cutting the budget deficit. 
Balance of trade surpluses were generated throughout the whole pe-
riod 1982 to 1988, but at enormous cost in terms of welfare. Living 
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standards fell drastically. Real wages fell by at least 30%, and poverty 
and unemployment increased. GDP growth was negative in 1982, 
1983 and 1986, and, on average, was slightly negative for the whole 
period. The stabilisation programmes introduced during this period 
were frequently disrupted, requiring revision and modification. The 
1983 Programme was seriously affected by the steep decline in oil 
prices between 1985 and 1987, and by the earthquake in Mexico City 
which caused severe disruption and imposed significant costs. By the 
end of 1987, Mexico was in serious fiscal crisis, partly resulting from 
the New York stock market crash, and capital flight from Mexico, and 
partly the result of high rates of inflation (8% per month). The peso 
was already depreciating, but then was formally devalued in Novem-
ber 1987. The fall in the value of the peso by over 100%, however, did 
not stop the flood of imports (in 1988, imports grew by 36% while 
exports grew by only 5%). In December 1987, the government intro-
duced a new ‘heterodox’ programme designed to control inflation, and 
the exchange rate was indexed to the price level. Inflation was reduced, 
based on an austere fiscal policy, and the public finances were im-
proved by the privatisation of public assets. In general, the aim was to 
liberalise the economy through reducing the size of the public sector, 
by removing price controls and subsidies, by encouraging FDI and by 
financial and trade reforms. Mexico embraced the Washington Con-
sensus. It was in this period of major macro-reforms, and reorientation 
of the economy, that trade liberalisation was initiated in a significant 
way. We now describe the process, and then attempt to evaluate its 
effects. 
3. Trade liberalisation 
Trade liberalisation has now been one of the cornerstones of economic 
policy-making in Mexico for two decades. Since 1985 there has been a 
radical reorientation of trade policy from a highly protectionist stance, 
focussed on the domestic market, to an intensive deregulation of the 
import tariff and licensing system. The impetus has come from within 
the country, as well as imposed from outside by the IMF and World 
Bank as part of various loan and structural adjustment packages 
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adopted in previous years. Mexico believed, and convinced itself, that 
trade (and financial) liberalisation could be the new engine of growth. 
It was after the IMF/World Bank meetings in Seoul in 1985 that 
the government confirmed its promise to liberalise trade. The pro-
gramme of trade liberalisation during 1985-87 was one of the most far-
reaching of any developing country. In a relatively brief period of 
time, tariff rates on most products were substantially reduced; refer-
ence prices were progressively removed, and non-tariff barriers were 
drastically decreased or eliminated. The first stage of the liberalisation 
programme was implemented in June 1985 when licenses were elimi-
nated on almost 3,600 tariff lines, leaving less than 1,000 under con-
trol. Import growth did not accelerate immediately, however, because 
at the same time there was a 32% real depreciation of the peso, and the 
economy was still in deep recession. In the same year, Mexico com-
menced negotiations to join the GATT, and became a full member in 
1986. The accession to GATT signalled the country’s intention to 
carry forward the trade liberalisation policy, which it did. In 1988, 
official prices for competitive imports were abolished entirely, and by 
1989 only 20% of imports were protected by the licensing system and 
12% by tariff coverage. The evolution of trade reforms between 1985 
and 1989 is shown in Table 1. 
 
TABLE 1 
QUANTITATIVE INDICATORS OF THE MEXICAN IMPORT REGIME 1985-89 (%) 
 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
 June December December December December December 
Domestic produc-
tion value covered 
by import licensing  92.2 47.1 39.8 25.4 21.3 19.8 
Production-weighted 
tariff averages  23.5 28.5 24.5 11.8 10.2 12.5 
Domestic produc-
tion value covered 
by official import 
prices 18.7 25.4 18.7 0.6 0.0 0.0 
Source: Ten Kate (1992). 
 
The new government of Carlos Salinas de Gortari was elected in 
1988 which committed itself to further trade and investment reforms. 
The emphasis was on reducing the dispersion of tariff rates with the 
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objective of producing a broadly uniform system of effective protec-
tion. In October 1989, a new framework agreement between Mexico 
and the USA was signed to facilitate more trade and investment be-
tween the two countries – a precursor of the NAFTA agreement in 
1994. FDI laws were also modified in 1989, eliminating some of the 
restrictions on foreign investment, particularly in the capital goods 
and technology-intensive industries. 
As well as the relaxation and elimination of import restrictions, 
an export promotion programme was also launched, focussing on the 
maquiladora sector. The maquiladora programme was originally 
launched in the mid-1960s in order to ameliorate the high unemploy-
ment in the northern border zone of Mexico that resulted from the 
termination of the Braceros system which employed Mexican migrant 
workers in the United States. Three facilitation programmes were 
initiated specifically for export industries in the manufacturing sector: 
firstly Pitex (Programa de Importación Temporal para Producir 
Artículos de Exportación) in 1985 giving duty rebates to firms with a 
high level of imported inputs embodied in exports; secondly, Altex 
(Empresas Altamente Exportadoras) in 1986 giving special administra-
tive, fiscal and financial treatment to firms with a high level of ex-
ports, and thirdly, Compex (Comisión Mixta para la Promoción de 
Exportaciones) in 1989 designed to overcome bureaucratic difficulties 
for producers selling goods abroad. One of the major drawbacks of the 
maquiladora sector from the point of view of the balance of payments, 
however, is that its net contribution to foreign exchange earnings is 
relatively low because the import content of exports is so high (we 
will return to this issue later when we discuss FDI). 
After the trade reforms between 1985 and 1987, the most signifi-
cant development was the negotiations in the early 1990s leading to 
the NAFTA agreement in 1994 between Mexico, Canada and the US. 
From the Mexican government’s point of view the major function of 
NAFTA was to embody the newly liberalised trade regime (since 
1985) into a comprehensive international treaty to lock-in free market 
policies against future changes of government. At a practical level, it 
marked the beginning of the removal of most of Mexico’s remaining 
barriers to trade and investment. Goods were divided into five catego-
ries, and a programme of tariff elimination was agreed for each (see 
Table 2). 85% of goods were put in categories A, B and C1, and the 
final date for completion of the agreement is 2008. 
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TABLE 2 
NAFTA’S TARIFF ELIMINATION SCHEDULE 
Group A Duties on Goods of this category shall be eliminated entirely and such 
goods shall be duty-free, effective 1st January 1994. 
Group B Duties on Goods of this category shall be removed in 5 equal stages begin-
ning on 1st January 1994, and such goods shall be duty-free, effective 1st 
January 1998. 
Group C1 Duties on Goods of this category shall be removed in 10 equal stages 
beginning on 1st January 1994, and such goods shall be duty-free, effective 
1st January 2003. 
Group C2 Duties on Goods of this category shall be removed in 15 equal stages 
beginning on 1st January 1994, and such goods shall be duty-free, effective 
1st January 2008. 
Group D Goods shall continue to receive duty-free treatment.  
Source: North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).  
 
The liberalisation process also contained other elements. It was 
agreed that trade barriers in agriculture and transport would be elimi-
nated. Restrictions on investment by multinational corporations were 
to be eased further. US and Canadian providers of financial services 
were to be accorded the same treatment as their domestic counter-
parts. Dispute resolution mechanisms were established, and tri-annual 
Commissions were formed to deal with issues relating to labour rights 
and environmental protection. 
No sooner had NAFTA been signed, however, than the country 
entered another crisis phase. First, there was the Zapatista uprising in 
Chiapas. Second, there was the assassination of the Presidential candi-
date, Luis Donaldo Colosio, and a Party chief. Thirdly, against the 
background of previous trade liberalisation, huge deficits on the bal-
ance of payments had arisen, partly due to the massive appreciation of 
the peso by over 70% in real terms compared to its 1987 value (see 
Figure 2 earlier). The current account deficit was 5% of GDP in 1992, 
5.9% in 1993 and 4.8% in 1994. There was no export-led growth, 
despite the promises of liberalisation. The Zedillo government, elected 
in December 1994, was confronted with massive capital flight from 
the country and a huge decline in foreign exchange reserves. There 
was an increase in FDI, but at the same time a serious fall in portfolio 
investment as asset prices tumbled. A $ 20 billion loan package was 
agreed with the US and IMF. The peso was devalued by 90%, and then 
allowed to float. The austerity measures imposed caused GDP to fall 
by 6.1% – the steepest decline in output in Mexico’s post-war history, 
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and the biggest since 1932. By the end of 1995 open unemployment 
had risen to over three million, and real wages fell by over 30%. Lustig 
(1997), a strong supporter of free trade and NAFTA, argues that 
NAFTA was not to blame for the crisis. It is true that NAFTA was 
not the primary cause, but the fact remains that it is economically 
naïve and always potentially disastrous for a country to liberalise trade 
when macroeconomic policy is encouraging capital inflows and the 
currency is appreciating – and so it turned out to be. 
On the 1st January 1995, Mexico joined the World Trade Organi- 
sation (WTO). The binding trade and foreign investment rules are 
contained in more than 60 agreements and decisions which were 
formulated during the Uruguay Round Negotiations 1986-94 signed in 
Marrakesh, April 1994. 
Apart from NAFTA, Mexico has signed several other Free 
Trade Agreements (FTAs) shown chronologically in Figure 3. In 1993, 
it became a member of APEC. In 1995, it agreed the G-3 FTA with 
 
FIGURE 3 
TIME PROFILE OF MEXICO’S FTAs AND ADHESION  
TO INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS 
 
Source: Secretaria de Economía, Mexico. 
 
Colombia and Venezuela, and a FTA with Bolivia and Costa Rica. In 
1998, it concluded a FTA with Nicaragua. In 2000, negotiations were 
concluded with the so-called ‘North Triangle’ of Guatemala, Hondu-
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ras and El Salvador, and a FTA with the European Union and Israel. 
In 2001, an agreement was signed with the European Association of 
Free Trade composed of Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzer-
land. Currently, there are active negotiations for a Free Trade Area of 
the Americas which would unite the whole of Latin America (apart 
from Cuba) in a free trade zone with North America. 
Despite all these trading agreements with the rest to the world, 
Mexico’s dependence on the United States for its exports and imports 
has increased inexorably through time. The share of Mexico’s exports 
going to the US has increased from 64% in 1980 to 89% in 2000. The 
share of Mexican imports coming from the US has increased from 
61% to 73% over the same period. A major part of this change has 
came about as a result of the nature of US investment in Mexico 
which uses the country as an export assembly platform providing its 
own exports as inputs, and which, in turn, has raised the income 
elasticity of demand for imports (as we shall see later). 
4. NAFTA and foreign direct investment 
For the Mexican government, the main purpose of NAFTA was not 
to further liberalise trade, which had already been extensively liberal-
ised, but to attract FDI as a means to improve economic performance 
and to ensure future access to the US market. The NAFTA agreement 
was also a signal to other foreign investors that they could locate in 
Mexico and also have access to the US market. As Blecker (1996) has 
argued, however, in order to obtain preferential access to the US 
market, Mexico was forced to agree to a liberalised trade and invest-
ment regime which maximised advantages for US and other multina-
tional enterprises, rather than furthering Mexican development objec-
tives. NAFTA has forced Mexico into low-wage (assembly-type) 
manufactures with a high foreign import content. Trade and invest-
ment liberalisation which takes this form is not the same as an out-
ward-oriented development strategy, particularly if exchange rate and 
internal macroeconomic policies are working in the opposite direc-
tion, and balance of payments difficulties arise. Other countries have 
liberalised, but the control of industrial development has not been 
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effectively left in the hands of multinational corporations (MNCs). In 
East Asia, for example, an outward-oriented development strategy was 
pursued, but combined with extensive government regulation and 
intervention to promote structural change and to shift resources into 
more capital-intensive and technologically sophisticated industries. 
Tight import restrictions and strict capital controls were maintained 
in the early stages of the export drive, and the exchange rate was 
supportive. Part of the failure of the liberalisation programme to 
achieve a faster and sustainable rate of growth in Mexico has been that 
the state is weak, and successive governments have been unable and 
unwilling to pursue an effective industrial policy to combine with 
liberalisation policies. 
Mexico started to modify its Foreign Investment Law (FIL) from 
the mid-1980s, by gradually reducing the range of economic activities 
reserved for ownership by the state or Mexican citizens. Significant 
changes took place in 1989, 1993/94 and 1999. In October 1989 a new 
agreement was signed with the United States to start ‘global conversa-
tions’ to facilitate trade and investment. In particular, and very impor-
tant for the US, domestic content rules were relaxed for the automo-
bile industry. In 1993, a new FIL was enacted reducing further the 
number of activities in which foreign participation was forbidden or 
restricted. When NAFTA was signed, it gave preferential treatment to 
FDI from the US and Canada, but also guaranteed favourable treat-
ment to all countries – no less favourable than that accorded to their 
own foreign investors. In January 1999, the majority of financial 
services were liberalised, and the government allowed 100% foreign 
participation in the banking sector, as well as in railways and gas. In 
2001, Mexico’s largest commercial bank, Banco Nacional de Mexico, 
was bought by Citicorp, which made Mexico the largest recipient of 
FDI in Latin America in that year (UNCTAD 2002).  
The evolution of FDI inflows into Mexico as a percentage of 
GDP is shown in Table 3. 
The rise in the share of FDI from the mid-1980s can be clearly 
seen, and there was an apparent quantum leap between 1993 and 1994 
which has been sustained. Part of this increase, however, is due to a 
change in the definition of FDI adopted in 1994 to make it compatible 
with the definitions used by the OECD and IMF. NAFTA has un-
doubtedly given a boost to FDI, probably of the order of 1.0 to 1.5% 
of GDP. 
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TABLE 3 
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT, NET INFLOWS (% of GDP) 
Year FDI Year FDI Year FDI 
1970 0.91 1981 0.93 1992 1.21 
1971 0.78 1982 0.84 1993 1.09 
1972 0.67 1983 0.31 1994 2.59 
1973 0.83 1984 0.22 1995 2.62 
1974 0.94 1985 0.27 1996 2.60 
1975 0.69 1986 1.18 1997 3.57 
1976 0.71 1987 2.31 1998 2.60 
1977 0.68 1988 1.42 1999 2.90 
1978 0.80 1989 1.36 2000 3.10 
1979 0.99 1990 1.00   
1980 0.96 1991 1.51   
Source: World Bank (2002). 
 
Most of the FDI comes from the US. The US share rose from 
46% in 1994 to 78% in 2001. Most of the investment is in sectors such 
as Machinery and Equipment (including automobiles), Chemicals, and 
Textile and Leather Products. These three sectors accounted for 80% 
of manufacturing FDI between 1994 and 2001, which, in turn, ac-
counted for 70% of total foreign investment. According to UNCTAD 
(2002), nearly two-thirds of Mexico’s exports originate from MNCs 
based in Mexico, and 30% from just 35 companies. On the surface, it 
might appear that FDI and MNCs confer a substantial benefit on the 
Mexican economy, but some caution is in order which leads to a 
rather different conclusion. 
Firstly, linkages between FDI and domestic industry are weak. 
Máttar, Moreno-Brid and Peres (2002) analyse the performance of FDI 
in the context of the macroeconomic policy reforms of the 1980s, and 
conclude that FDI has not led to an increase in fixed capital formation 
in the country as a whole; moreover, it has led to a segmentation 
between an export-oriented sector linked to foreign capital on the one 
hand, and smaller indigenous firms focusing on domestic demand on 
the other. Mortimore (2000) also concludes from a comprehensive 
study of FDI in Mexico that it has tended to result in export oases 
possessing little contact with the domestic economy, thereby truncat-
ing or limiting the national industrialisation process. 
Secondly, in some instances, domestic industry has been de-
stroyed by competition from FDI and imported inputs used. Máttar, 
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Moreno-Brid and Peres (2002) conclude that the high import content 
of Mexican exports has disrupted domestic chains of production by 
displacing and eliminating firms that previously produced for the 
domestic market, but are unable to compete with MNCs entry. And 
now MNCs themselves are closing subsidiaries, especially in the ma-
quiladora sector, and relocating either in cheaper locations (e.g. China) 
for the production of low value-added goods, or back to North Amer-
ica in the high value-added range of goods such as luxury cars. In 2002 
alone, over 5,000 plants closed; and 250,000 workers have lost their 
jobs in the maquiladora sector since 2000. 
Thirdly, because the import content of FDI is so high, its con-
tribution to net exports is low. Under NAFTA, for example, the 
Mexican authorities permitted the assembly of automobile exports 
that incorporated a higher level of imported components than cars for 
the domestic market: 70% compared to 40%. This also hindered the 
integration of the car industry with local suppliers. In work on tem-
poral causality between FDI, exports and imports, Pacheco-López 
(2003) finds evidence of strong ‘Granger-causality’ between FDI and 
imports, but there is no evidence that FDI has raised the growth of 
non-oil exports since the NAFTA treaty was signed. Cimoli and 
Correa (2002, p. 13) describe very well what has been going on in 
Mexico and elsewhere in Latin America where there is a strong FDI 
presence:  
“many production activities have been seriously disrupted by trade 
liberalisation and by the massive inflow of imports […] substituting 
domestically produced intermediate inputs by cheaper (and some-
times better) imported ones, reorganising themselves more as as-
sembly-type operations based on a much higher unit import con-
tent […]. The share of large firms in GDP has significantly in-
creased […] while countless [small and medium] enterprises have 
been forced to exit the market altogether”. 
 
The final point to make is one that we have made already, but is 
worth repeating, and that is the arrangements concerning FDI have 
effectively removed the ability of the state to intervene and protect 
indigenous industry (Blecker 1996, Arestis and Paliginis 1996). Under 
the NAFTA agreement, Mexico is effectively prohibited from using 
most of the types of strategic industrial and trade policies for a success-
ful outward-orientated development strategy that would maintain a 
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balance between the growth of exports and imports without sacrific-
ing the growth of output. We will now give some quantitative estima-
tions of the impact of trade liberalisation on the rate of growth of 
exports, imports and the trade balance, and then show how the rise in 
the income elasticity of demand for imports has reduced the sustain-
able growth rate of the Mexican economy from over 6% per annum in 
the pre-liberalisation phase to less than 3% per annum since the mid-
1980s. 
5. The impact of trade liberalisation on exports, imports and the 
trade balance 
One of the ways of estimating the impact of a sudden switch in policy-
regime is to test for structural breaks in time series data. In the case of 
trade liberalisation which started in 1985, and NAFTA in 1994, we are 
interested in testing for structural breaks in export growth, import 
growth and the trade balance in these years. The technique is to spec-
ify estimating equations for these dependent variables, and then add to 
the independent variables a shift dummy variable in the year of policy 
change to test for the significance of a structural change. 
The growth of Mexican non-oil exports (xt) is assumed to be 
primarily a function of the growth of real income in the USA (gus), the 
change in the real exchange rate (p) and export growth in the previous 
period (xt–1). The growth of Mexican imports (mt) is made a function 
of the growth of domestic income (gd), the change in the real exchange 
rate (p) and import growth in the previous period (mt–1). The rate of 
change of the trade balance (tb) is a function of the above variables plus 
changes in the terms of trade (tot) (since the trade balance is measured 
in monetary terms).1 We then add dummy variables to the equations 
for the trade liberalisation period, experimenting with 1985, 1986 and 
1987 for the mid-1980s reforms, and 1994, 1995 and 1996 for NAFTA, 
and estimate the equations over the period 1970 to 2000. Using the 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for unit roots, all the variables included 
–––––––––– 
1 i.e. tb = (xt + px) – (mt +pm), where px and pm are the rate of change of export 
and import prices, respectively, and px – pm = tot. 
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in the equations are found to be stationary, so that we can be confi-
dent that the results obtained are not spurious due to a common time 
trend. With lagged dependent variables in the equations, we can also 
estimate both short- and long-run coefficients. The results are pre-
sented in Table 4. 
 
TABLE 4 
THE IMPACT OF LIBERALISATION ON EXPORT GROWTH,  
IMPORT GROWTH AND THE BALANCE OF TRADE (1970-2000) 
Export growth 
 xt  = –0.11 + 5.19 (gus) + 0.55 (p) + 0.15 (lib1986) –0.05 (lib1994) – 0.19 (xt–1). 
        (–1.96)   (3.54)           (2.93)          (2.26)              (–0.68)                (–1.16) 
 
R2 = 0.50 
DW = 1.95 
 
Import growth 
mt  = –0.11 + 2.67 (gd) – 0.61 (p) + 0.13 (lib1985)  + 0.00 (lib1994) + 0.07 (mt–1) 
         (–1.84)   (2.66)       (–3.00)         (2.25)                   (0.00)                 (0.67) 
 
R2 = 0.83 
DW = 1.86 
 
Trade balance growth 
 tbt = 0.29 – 4.30 (gd) – 1.21 (gus) + 0.07 (p) – 0.02 (tot) – 0.18 (lib1985)   
         (2.71)  (–3.48)     (–0.61)          (0.23)       (–0.08)        (–2.42) 
 
        –0.06 (lib1994) 
        (–0.86) 
 
R2 = 0.81 
DW = 2.47 
 
 
Note: bracketed terms are t-statistics. 
 
The equations are well-determined, and produce some interesting 
(and surprising) results. First considering exports, Mexican export 
growth is highly sensitive to the performance of the US economy with 
an income elasticity of demand in excess of 5. Mexican export com-
petitiveness also matters, but the price elasticity is relatively low at 
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0.55. The impact of the trade reforms seems to have been delayed till 
1986. We found no evidence of a significant structural break in export 
growth in 1985, but there is evidence of a break in 1986 when export 
growth rose 15 percentage points, allowing for changes in the real 
exchange rate and the growth of income in the US. In fact, non-oil 
exports rose by 56% in 1986, so that roughly one-quarter of the in-
crease can be attributed to liberalisation. This might be regarded as a 
substantial effect, but the important point to bear in mind is that the 
average export growth of all goods and services in the post-
liberalisation years was no higher than in the pre-liberalisation years. 
Any permanent structural effect must therefore have been offset by 
unfavourable movements in other determinants of export perform-
ance, including the exchange rate. It can be seen from Figure 2 (earlier) 
that since 1986 there has been a virtually continuous appreciation of 
the real exchange rate. 
This behaviour of exports contrasts markedly with that of im-
ports. Imports responded to liberalisation more quickly than exports. 
There was a significant structural break in 1985 when import growth 
jumped 13 percentage points, holding other variables constant. This 
compares with actual import growth of 11%. The positive impact on 
import growth seems not to have been offset by other factors since the 
average growth of import volume prior to 1985 was only 6% per 
annum compared to 14% post-1985. Liberalisation seems to have 
opened up a permanent imbalance between the growth of imports and 
exports, allowing for the difference in the growth of income in the US 
and Mexico, and movements in the real exchange rate. Other interest-
ing features of the import growth equation are that the income elastic-
ity of demand for imports is well-determined with a relatively high 
value of 2.67, and price competitiveness also matters, but the price 
elasticity is relatively low at 0.61. Combining the export and import 
price elasticities gives a value of 1.16, which means that the Marshall-
Lerner condition for a successful depreciation of the currency is just 
satisfied – but in fact the Mexican authorities have allowed the real 
exchange rate to appreciate, at least since 1986 (with the exception of 
1994-95). 
The permanent imbalance between the growth of imports and 
exports associated with the trade liberalisation in the mid-1980s shows 
up in the trade balance equation where there is a significant negative 
sign on the shift dummy variable for 1985, with a coefficient of –0.18. 
The rate of change of the trade balance is also significantly affected by 
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the growth of the Mexican economy, but surprisingly not by the 
growth of the US economy. The coefficient on the real exchange rate 
variable is also insignificant but this is probably a reflection of the fact 
mentioned above that the sum of the price elasticities of demand for 
exports and imports hardly differs from unity. 
Turning now to the impact of NAFTA, we have not found it 
possible in any of our estimations to detect an independent significant 
effect of NAFTA on export growth, import growth or movements in 
the trade balance. Shift dummy variables for 1994, 1995 and 1996 were 
used, but none were significant. Perhaps this result is not surprising, 
however, because by 1994 there was not much of Mexico’s trade left 
to liberalise. As we argued earlier, NAFTA had more to do with FDI 
and US access to the Mexican financial markets than with trade per se. 
Our conclusions also accord with other studies. Gould (1998) and 
Krueger (2000) both argue that the gains from NAFTA are difficult to 
disentangle from the effect of exchange rate changes and other policies. 
Neither find that NAFTA had a significant effect on bilateral trade 
flows, at least in the early years. Krueger finds that Mexican exports 
grew most rapidly in sectors in which they grew most rapidly in the 
rest of the world, so that no special effect can be attributed to 
NAFTA. It is true that export growth jumped from 8% in 1993 to 
18% in 1994 and 30% in 1995, but then export growth reverted to the 
pre-1994 average. There was also a big increase in import growth in 
1994, but since then the average growth has been no different to the 
period 1985-1993. This sudden change in 1994-95 undoubtedly had 
more to do with the rapid depreciation of the real exchange rate in 
these years than NAFTA. It is true that the volume of trade between 
the US, Canada and Mexico has increased quite sharply, but there has 
been little change in the rate of growth of Mexican exports and im-
ports to and from the US. Since 1994, Mexican export growth to the 
US has been 16.1% per annum compared to 14.4% per annum from 
1980 to 1993. Mexican import growth from the US has been 15.7% 
per annum since 1994 compared to 14.2% during 1980-93. There has 
been trade diversion as well as trade creation. 
Since trade liberalisation, Mexico has experienced two severe 
balance of payments/exchange rate crises: one in 1986 and the other in 
1994-95. Both crises were associated with inappropriate macroeco-
nomic policies and an overvalued exchange rate, but trade liberalisa-
tion in these years did not help the situation. Table 6 gives details of 
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movements in the trade balance and balance of payments in relation to 
GDP since 1979. Both accounts have been extremely volatile, but 
more so in the 1980s and 1990s than in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, 
when import tariffs and controls were used to ameliorate deficits 
without too much damage to the real economy. This brings us to the 
question of the relationship between trade liberalisation, the balance 
of payments and growth. 
 
TABLE 5 
TOTAL TRADE BALANCE, NON-OIL TRADE BALANCE,  
TRADE IN SERVICES,  TOTAL CURRENT ACCOUNT  
AND NON-OIL CURRENT ACCOUNT RELATIVE TO GDP (%) 
Year TB/GDP Non-oil TB/GDP 







1979 –1.59 –5.34 n.a n.a. n.a. 
1980 –1.37 –6.04 –3.67 –4.67 –9.71 
1981 –1.27 –6.02 –4.37 –5.30 –10.39 
1982 3.59 –4.81 –7.13 –3.01 –11.95 
1983 9.47 –1.28 –6.33 3.94 –7.61 
1984 7.51 –1.95 –5.90 2.38 –7.85 
1985 3.24 –2.64 –3.79 0.34 –6.43 
1986 3.88 –0.99 –6.16 –1.06 –7.15 
1987 6.26 0.11 –4.61 3.02 –4.50 
1988 1.42 –2.24 –3.95 –1.30 –6.19 
1989 0.18 –3.35 –3.93 –2.61 –7.28 
1990 –0.34 –4.18 –4.01 –2.84 –8.20 
1991 –2.01 –3.96 –2.72 –4.66 –6.68 
1992 –4.38 –6.67 –3.27 –6.72 –9.94 
1993 –3.34 –5.18 –3.36 –5.80 –8.55 
1994 –4.39 –6.16 –3.56 –7.05 –9.72 
1995 2.48 –0.47 –4.41 –0.55 –4.88 
1996 1.97 –1.54 –4.08 –0.75 –5.62 
1997 0.16 –2.67 –3.37 –1.91 –6.04 
1998 –1.90 –3.61 –3.40 –3.86 –7.02 
1999 –1.16 –3.24 –3.07 –2.92 –6.31 
2000 –1.39 –4.24 –2.99 –3.16 –7.23 
a Includes transfers, where remittances from workers are accounted for. 
Source: own calculations based on data from World Bank (2002) and Bank of Mexico. 
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6. The balance of payments and growth in Mexico 
There have been several recent studies of the impact of the balance of 
payments on Mexican growth which we will briefly discuss before 
presenting our own estimations. The consensus seems to be that the 
trade reforms, combined with the liberalisation of FDI, have increased 
through time the income elasticity of demand for imports without 
increasing the growth of exports. This means that using Thirlwall’s 
(1979) balance of payments constrained growth model in its simplest 
form of gB = x/π (where π is the income elasticity of demand for 
imports), the growth rate consistent with balance of payments equilib-
rium (gB) has fallen through time. Loría and Fuji (1997) provide a 
descriptive study showing how the growth of GDP consistent with 
balanced trade has continuously declined since the early 1980s as a 
result of adjustment and stabilisation programmes implemented after 
the debt crisis and the liberalisation of trade. López and Cruz (2000) 
also document the worsening trade-off between growth and the bal-
ance of payments, but put more blame on the exchange rate. Never-
theless, they show that to maintain trade equilibrium, the income 
elasticity of demand for imports would have to fall by more than one-
half if there is no improvement in export performance. It is not clear 
that a once-for-all exchange rate adjustment is capable of producing the 
required structural change, or that a continuous depreciation of the 
real exchange rate is feasible. Ocegueda (2000) compares estimations of 
Mexico’s GDP growth between two periods, 1960-82 and 1983-97, and 
finds that the growth rate consistent with balance of payments equi-
librium worsened after 1982 because the income elasticity of demand 
for imports increased from 1.05 to 4.91. The latter estimate looks 
high, but we find a similar elasticity for the period 1982-96 (see be-
low). 
The work of Moreno-Brid (1998, 1999 and 2001) has so far been 
the most comprehensive and rigorous in this field of enquiry for 
Mexico. He does a number of interesting things including extending 
the basic Thirlwall model of gB = x/π to allow for a sustainable cur-
rent account deficit to GDP (financed by capital inflows), which gives 
the formula gB = θx/[π – (1–θ)] where θ is the ratio of exports to 
imports. The two models give the same growth rate if exports equal 
imports and θ = 1, but not otherwise. He then applies the two models 
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to Mexico’s growth experience over the period 1967-99, distinguishing 
three overlapping periods prior to 1985 and post-1982. The income 
elasticity of demand for imports is estimated by the Johansen (1991) 
cointegration method. The estimates are shown in Table 6, together 
with data on export growth, actual GDP growth and the predicted 
growth of GDP from the simple and extended balance of payments 
equilibrium growth models. 
 
TABLE 6 
MORENO-BRID’S ESTIMATES OF MEXICO’S BALANCE  
OF PAYMENTS EQUILIBRIUM GROWTH RATE 
Period 
Growth of  
GDP % 
Simple model






of imports (π) 
1967-1999 3.87 4.78 4.40 8.47 1.77 
 Before reforms 
1968-83 5.52 5.85 5.46 9.17 1.57 
1969-84 5.34 5.84 5.29 8.47 1.53 
1970-85 5.05 5.62 5.17 8.66 1.54 
 After reforms 
1982-97 1.65 2.19 2.86 7.74 3.54 
1983-98 2.63 2.76 3.26 8.59 3.11 
1984-99 2.79 2.91 3.70 9.14 3.14 
Source: Moreno-Brid (2001). 
 
The first thing to notice is that the balance of payments equilib-
rium growth model fits the growth experience of Mexico remarkably 
well, with Moreno-Brid’s extension of the basic model performing 
slightly better up to 1985, and the basic model predicting better after 
the trade reforms. Notice the slow-down of growth after the reforms. 
Up to 1985, GDP growth averaged 5.3% per annum. After 1982, 
growth averaged only 2.4%. Notice also that there is no evidence of 
faster growth in the post-reform period. The fall in the sustainable 
growth rate has been entirely due to the rise in the income elasticity of 
demand for imports from an average of 1.55 pre-reforms to 3.26 post-
reforms. This, of course, is consistent with the econometric estimates 
we made earlier of a more than doubling in the growth of imports 
post-1985 (see Table 4). 
We take a similar approach to Moreno-Brid by estimating the 
evolution of the income elasticity of demand for imports year by year 
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between 1973 and 1999 using thirteen overlapping periods, and then 
we focus more precisely on the difference that the mid-1980s trade 
reforms made to growth performance by comparing the model’s 
predictions from 1973 to 1985/86 with the period 1986/87 to 1999. 
The evolution of the income elasticity (estimated using an autoregres-
sive distributed lag model of import demand) is shown in Table 7. 
 
TABLE 7 
LONG RUN ELASTICITIES OF DEMAND FOR MEXICAN IMPORTS (π) 
Period π Period π 
1973-87 1.21 1980-94 2.47 
1974-88 1.50 1981-95 3.34 
1975-89 1.85 1982-96 4.56 
1976-90 2.09 1983-97 4.43 
1977-91 2.31 1984-98 3.12 
1978-92 2.20 1985-99 3.15 
1979-93 2.04   
Source: Pacheco-López (2003). 
 
As liberalisation has proceeded, the gradual rise in the income 
elasticity of imports can be clearly seen (with big temporary jumps in 
1982-96 and 1983-97 when import growth changed from –15% in 1995 
to +22% in both 1996 and 1997). The estimates corroborate those of 
Moreno-Brid. 
The results of applying the estimates and model to understand 
Mexico’s growth performance pre- and post-trade reforms in 1985 are 
shown in Table 8. 
 
TABLE 8 
THE IMPACT OF TRADE REFORMS ON GROWTH IN MEXICO 
Period 








of imports (π) 
1973-99 3.6 4.4 19.8 2.2 
 Pre-liberalisation 
1973-85 5.0 6.9 19.0 1.3 
1974-86 4.3 5.8 18.7 1.5 
 Post-liberalisation 
1986-98 2.8 2.9 19.2 3.1 
1987-99 2.8 3.2 10.5 3.2 
BNL Quarterly Review 164 
The balance of payments equilibrium growth model over-
predicts the actual growth rate in the pre-liberalisation period (partly 
due to adverse terms of trade movements and capital outflows in the 
1980s), but the important point to note is the fall in the sustainable 
growth rate caused by the doubling of the income elasticity of demand 
for imports, and this fall is mirrored in the reduction of the actual 
growth rate from 5% per annum in the pre-liberalisation period to 
under 3% post-liberalisation. 
7. The future 
We conclude this essay on the political economy of Mexico with a 
consideration of the future, particularly the proposal for a Free Trade 
Area of the Americas (FTAA) due to be implemented in 2005. As a 
leading Latin American country with experience in negotiating with 
the US, Mexico has participated actively in the negotiations for a 
FTAA. However, such negotiations stalled in the recent IX Ministe-
rial Meeting which took place in Puebla, Mexico, in February 2004. 
The main controversial issue was the subsidies in the agricultural 
sector. The US and Canadian position has been obtuse regarding the 
elimination of subsidies in this sector, where most Latin American 
countries could compete advantageously. MERCOSUR (e.g. Argen-
tina, Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay) and Chile and Bolivia are strongly 
opposed to agricultural subsidies. Mexico, on the other hand, has 
supported the US position which is surprising since the farming sector 
(and particularly maize growers) has suffered badly under NAFTA, as 
is evident from the serious contraction of agricultural employment. 
Mexico expects to benefit from the FTAA, but it is worth re-
membering that the same expectations concerning wages, more jobs 
and faster growth when NAFTA was signed in 1994 have never mate-
rialised. A few statistics illustrate the divorce between rhetoric and 
reality. In 1994, the average hourly wage in manufacturing in Mexico 
was $ 2.1 and in the US $ 12. Such a wage differential remains. In 
2001, the average manufacturing wage in Mexico was $ 2.5 and in the 
US $ 14.8. Still, 63% of the economically active population of Mexico 
(40 million workers) do not have any social security benefits or em-
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ployment rights; and 20% of employees work without any fixed 
location. These figures illustrate how the income distribution has 
deteriorated and informal unemployment has increased. Another 
indication of the deterioration of working conditions is the amount of 
emigration and the remittances by Mexican workers in the US, which 
has become the second most important source of foreign exchange 
after oil.  
There is nothing in the doctrine of free trade that guarantees an 
equal distribution of the gains from trade between countries, or an 
equal distribution of the gains between groups within countries. Some 
countries, and groups within countries, can easily suffer an absolute 
loss. The moral of our study of Mexico is that in any future trade 
negotiations, it is extremely important for countries to determine 
what they think their capacity growth rate is (determined by labour 
force and productivity growth) and to make sure that any trade 
agreements that they make are compatible with that rate. In particu-
lar, they need to consider the balance of payments implications of 
trade liberalisation and to ensure that imports do not grow faster than 
exports. The exchange rate has a role to play in smoothing the liberali-
sation process, but a depreciating exchange rate cannot be guaranteed 
to rectify a permanent imbalance between the growth of imports and 
exports, and in any case, would lead to an inflationary spiral. Defla-
tion and growth below capacity are the inevitable result. This has been 
the experience of Mexico since the move to free trade in the mid-
1980s.  
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